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THE NONOBVIOUSNESS REQUIREMENT FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS-
RESOLVING UNCERTAINTY IN FAVOR
OF INNOVATION
Song Huangt
I. INTRODUCTION
The biotechnology industry is primarily concerned with the
commercial development of therapeutic, biochemical, and
pharmaceutical products and processes, many of which are derived
from manipulation of DNA molecules and their encoded proteins.
Over the last thirty years, patents have emerged as an important, and
sometimes controversial, tool for protecting these biotechnological
products and processes. However, with the rapid scientific advances
in this field, a degree of uncertainty regarding the nonobviousness
requirement involving certain biotechnological inventions has been
encountered.' Accordingly, there is a need to clarify the legal
standards for determining the nonobviousness requirement-also
referred to as the ultimate condition of patentability. While this
determination is ultimately a question of public policy, based on
2
underlying factual inquiries, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") has attempted to articulate legal
standards of nonobviousness applied specifically in certain
biotechnological inventions. Through the analysis of five major cases
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received his LL.B degree from the China University of Political Science and Law (Beijing,
China) in 1989, his LL.M degree from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1995 and
his LL.M degree in Intellectual Property Law from Santa Clara University in 2004. He is
licensed to practice law in the State of New York, Washington D.C. as well as the People's
Republic of China. The author wishes to thank Kui Zhang (B.S., Capital University of Medical
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paper.
1. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 647 (Foundation Press
2001).
2. See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 131 (Aspen Publishers
2003).
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decided by the Federal Circuit dealing with biotechnological
inventions from 1988 to 1995, 3 this paper will explore the legal
standard for obviousness in this field and the related public policy
considerations.
Generally, there exist two major themes surrounding the
nonobviousness standard: (1) in the three decisions before the
decision in In re Bel( in 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit focused its analysis on the scientific methods involved in the
invention and primarily gave weight to two factors: (i) whether the
prior art would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art that
they should make the claimed composition or device, or carry out the
claimed process; and (ii) whether the prior art would also have
revealed that in so making or carrying out, those of ordinary skill
would have a reasonable expectation of success; 5 and (2) through the
Bell decision in 1993 and the decision in In re Deuel6 in 1995, an
emphasis on the analytical framework has been shifted from the
scientific methods to the obviousness of the claimed composition
(e.g., a particular purified, isolated and sequenced DNA or cDNA
molecule encoding a protein).7 The reasoning underlying the two
themes might seem to be related to the fact that the claimed
inventions in the earliest three decisions were essentially directed to a
method or process while the subject matters sought to be patented in
the most recent two cases involved a product or composition.
Despite the particular facts that may largely dictate the particular
analytical framework in each of the five cases to be discussed, this
paper will also argue that the Federal Circuit should be conscientious
about a general responsibility to make an ultimate judgment as to
which inventions should be patented and which should not, by taking
into account the broad public policy implications and ramifications in
order to realize the goal of promoting the progress of "useful arts"
mandated by the United States Constitution.8 One example regarding
the practical effects of the two decisions in Bell and Deuel was that
companies specializing in genomic research have filed many DNA
sequence applications. This new trend of patent filings within the
3. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Vaeck, 947
F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
5. See infra Part II.D.
6. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
7. See infra Parts IID, II.E.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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biotechnology field is problematic because genomic research
companies are stockpiling DNA sequence patents directed merely to
partial DNA sequences that have no known function.9 An apparent
public policy implication of this trend is that innovation in the
biotechnology field may be impeded, rather than promoted, if
scientists will have to negotiate and obtain a license from, and pay a
royalty to, the multiple patent holders for making or using patented
DNA sequences in their scientific research.
Part II of this paper will analyze the five cases decided by the
Federal Circuit dealing with biotechnological inventions (including
processes and products). The aim of the analyses is to expose a
uniform standard of nonobviousness as applicable to gene-related
inventions. Another position of this paper is that the Federal Circuit
should give greater deference in its review of the decisions of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") because the PTO
appears to be the appropriate institution to make factual findings in
respect of biotechnology inventions. In Part III, this paper will
identify three specific proposals regarding how to apply the
nonobviousness standard under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) with respect to
gene-related inventions for the purpose of creating more certainty in
courts' decisions.
II. CASE STUDIES
Before embarking upon the case studies, some background
information regarding the basic principles of the nonobviousness
standard is useful.
In general, under the 1952 Patent Act, the nonobviousness
requirement states that "if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art,"'10 the invention is
not patentable.
In the 1966 decision of Graham v. John Deere Co.," the
Supreme Court presented an exposition of how the above
nonobviousness requirement embodied in § 103 of the Patent Act
should be applied. The Court held that nonobviousness is ultimately a
question of law with underlying factual inquiries under which "the
9. See Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents:
Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143 (2000).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2002).
11. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved."' 2 In addition,
secondary considerations (also known as objective evidence of
nonobviousness) such as "commercial success, long felt but
unresolved needs, failure of others, etc." that "may have relevancy"
can also be considered as "indicia of obviousness or
nonobviousness. 1 3 The foregoing factors are frequently referred to
as the "Graham factors" or "Graham test" for making nonobviousness
analyses.
The Federal Circuit has suggested various refinements of the
Graham test. For example, an invention can be deemed obvious if an
inventor merely pieced together parts of different prior art references;
there must be a reason, suggestion or motivation in the prior art to
combine the prior art elements in the way in which they are combined
in the patentee's invention. 14  The rationale underlying this
requirement is that hindsight should not be used in such a way that the
inventor's specification is used as a blueprint in deciding
nonobviousness. 15  Further, an invention will not be obvious if
practicing the invention was merely "obvious to try.,' 6  Thus, the
standard for nonobviousness should involve a reasonable expectation
of success by a person having ordinary skill in the art. In other words,
if the prior art provided only general guidance or general direction as
to the possibility that the claimed invention can be attempted or
experimented (thereby arguably making it "obvious to try"), and those
skilled in the art would not believe that the general guidance provided
or general direction pointed to by the prior art would have a
reasonable expectation of success to practice the claimed invention,
the invention that may be obvious to try is nevertheless nonobvious.
I will now turn to the discussions of five cases decided by the
Federal Circuit to demonstrate how the foregoing principles of non-
obviousness have been applied to patents or patent applications
directed to biotechnological inventions.
12. See id. at 17.
13. Id. at 17-18.
14. See Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,
1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
15. See Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
16. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In
re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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A. In re O'Farrell (1988)" 7
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("Board") rejected O'Farrell's patent application on
grounds of obviousness. 18  The patent applicants appealed to the
Federal Circuit for judicial review of the decision by the Board.19 The
Federal Circuit found that the prior art contained an explicit
suggestion to modify the prior art for practicing the claimed invention
and certain predictable methods to carry out the suggestion are
available.20  The court further held that for obviousness under 35
U.S.C. §103, all that is required is a "reasonable expectation of
success."
21
1. Claimed invention
The claimed invention involved manipulating a bacterium to
produce a protein from a completely different species. Specifically,
the patent application concerned a method for producing a foreign,
fused protein in a transformed species of bacteria. The process
involved isolating the stretch of DNA (i.e., the gene coding for that
foreign protein), incorporating the gene into a cloning vector (called
plasmid23), and inserting the cloning vector into the bacterium. 24
All organisms, whether man, mouse or lowly bacterium, use the
same molecular rules (i.e., three nucleotides code for an amino acid)
to make proteins under the control of genes, and the biochemical
machinery that replicates and translates DNA is the same among all
organisms. 25 As such, genes from one species can be inserted into the
genome of another; a gene for a human protein can be expressed in a
bacterium.26 These genes from a foreign source are said to be
27heterologous genes. Bacteria that contain foreign genes are said to
17. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
18. Id. at 901.
19. Id. at 895
20. Id. at 902-03.
21. Id. at 904.
22. Id. at 895.
23. Bacteria are single-celled organisms whose DNA exists in a simpler form than that of
multi-cellular organisms such as humans. A bacterial genome includes small, circular loops of
DNA called plasmids. These plasmids allow manipulation of bacterial DNA. Plasmids can be
isolated, manipulated, and reintroduced to the bacterial species.
24. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 895.
25. Id. at 898.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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be transformed.28
The claimed invention in O'Farrell was a method to produce a
predetermined foreign protein in a transformed host species of
bacteria. 29 This was accomplished by creating a. plasmid (a cloning
vector) that includes a portion of a gene indigenous to the bacteria.3°
Linked to this gene is the DNA coding for the desired foreign protein
(i.e., the heterologous gene).31 Upon successful insertion of the
plasmid into the bacteria, the biochemical machinery of the bacteria
will recognize the indigenous gene and begin to express it (the
process whereby the information in the gene is used to synthesize the
new protein).32 Since the desired foreign protein gene is physically
linked to the indigenous gene of the host bacteria, the bacteria will
continue reading along the DNA ("read-through" occurs from .the
indigenous gene portion into the heterologous gene in the same
reading frame) and produce a "fused" protein consisting of the
indigenous and foreign protein.33
2. Analysis
The Federal Circuit followed the analytical framework by
making factual inquiries relating to the four Graham factors: "(1) the
scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the
art at the time the invention was made; and (4) objective evidence of
non-obviousness, if any."34
The court evaluated prior art and found an explicit suggestion for
the claimed invention.35 The prior art in this case primarily consisted
of (i) a scientific paper published by the co-inventors that described a
method for making a cloning vector with indigenous genes; and (ii) a
scientific paper published by another group of scientists that taught
the method to insure the inserted foreign gene has the same reading
frame as the rest of the plasmid.36 The court found that the main
difference between the prior art and the claimed invention was the
28. Id.
29. Id. at 895
30. In re 0 'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 895.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 895-902.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 902.
35. Id. at 903.
36. In re 0 'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 899-902.
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nature of the heterologous (or foreign) gene used.37 The paper by the
other group of scientists discussed using a foreign gene from a frog
that coded for a ribosomal RNA as their test gene.38 The frog gene
was chosen as a test gene for reasons of convenience and availability,
although a ribosomal RNA is not normally translated into protein.39
In contrast, the claimed invention substitutes a gene for a known,
predetermined protein.40  The paper further predicted that if a gene
that codes for a protein were to be substituted for the ribosomal RNA
gene, "a readthrough transcript might allow for extensive translation
of a functional eukaryotic polypeptide. ''4 1 Thus, the prior art
explicitly suggested that the substitution is the difference between the
claimed invention and the prior art, and presented preliminary
evidence suggesting that the method could be used to make proteins.42
The court concluded that the prior art provided detailed methods and
techniques that supplied "a reasonable expectation of success,"
thereby making the claimed invention obvious at the time the
invention was made.43
The court found that the prior art "explicitly suggested the
substitution" of a known protein for the ribosomal RNA gene.
44
However, it is generally understood that a mere suggestion is not
enough for a finding of obviousness. Accordingly, the appellants in
this case argued that the suggestions were merely invitations to
attempt the experiment and rejection of the claimed invention would
constitute "the application of a standard of 'obvious to try' to the field
of molecular biology.
'A5
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that it had previously rejected
the "obvious to try" as the standard under § 103.46 The court admitted
37. Id. at 901-02.
38. Id. at 900.
39. Id. at 899-902.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 901. Man, other animals, plants, protozoa, algae, and yeast are eukaryotic
organisms: their DNA is packaged in chromosomes in a special compartment of the cell, the
nucleus. Proteins are large polymeric molecules consisting of chains of smaller building blocks,
called amino acids, that are linked together covalently. The chemical bonds linking amino acids
together are called peptide bonds, so proteins are also called polypeptides.
42. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 901-04.
43. Id.
44. Id. at901.
45. Id. at 902.
46. See, e.g., In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Geiger, 815 F.2d
686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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that every obvious invention is also, in a sense, obvious to try. 47 This
seems to say that the contrary is not always true. In other words, an
invitation to attempt an experiment (which is obvious to try) may or
may not make that experiment obvious. The question then posed by
the court is: "[W]hen is an invention that was obvious to try
nevertheless nonobvious? '48 The answer lies in whether or not "a
reasonable expectation of success" is also provided by the prior art.
The court supplied the following two situations in which the
given suggestion would only point in the general direction of the
invention but is short of supplying the requisite detail in order to form
"a reasonable expectation of success" to practice the claimed
invention:
The admonition that "obvious to try" is not the standard under
§ 103 has been directed mainly at two kinds of error. In some
cases, what would have been "obvious to try" would have been to
vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until
one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave
either no indication of which parameters were critical or no
direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be
successful .... In others, what was "obvious to try" was to explore
a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a
promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only
general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention
or how to achieve it.
4 9
The scenarios described by the court characterize the nature of
scientific techniques made available by the prior art. The court
concluded that neither of the two situations applied to the O'Farrell
invention.50  The court considered that the suggestion disclosed or
described in the prior art had provided an explicit and detailed
methodology to make a fused protein in transformed bacteria. In
other words, the types of techniques and information described or
disclosed in the prior art are not merely "parameters," "numerous
possible choices," or "general guidance," but "detailed enabling
methodology for practicing the claimed invention, a suggestion to
modify the prior art to practice the claimed invention, and evidence
suggesting that it would be successful.' In view of this, the court
finally concluded that an invention would be deemed obvious when
47. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 902-03.
2005] NONOBVIOUSNESS REQUIREMENT UNCERTAINTY 605
the prior art contained an explicit suggestion to modify the prior art
and also supplied detailed methods to realize the suggestion with "a
reasonable expectation of success. '52 In this connection, the court
made the following holding:
Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success.
Indeed, for many inventions that seem quite obvious, there is no
absolute predictability of success until the invention is reduced to
practice. There is always at least a possibility of unexpected
results, that would then provide an objective basis for showing that
the invention, although apparently obvious, was in law
nonobvious .... For obviousness under § 103, all that is required is
a reasonable expectation of success.
5 3
What the court was citing here was a rule that a primafacie case
of obviousness can be rebutted by evidence of a possibility of
unexpected results.54  In other words, an invention would be
nonobvious if the patentee or patent applicant could come up with
evidence that there is a possibility of unexpected results. Although
the court did not elucidate further, it seems that the appellants in this
case failed to show evidence proving the possibility of unexpected
results. In response to the appellants' argument that successful
synthesis of protein was still uncertain after the publication of the
scientific paper prepared by two of the co-inventors, the court
observed in the prior art that expression of the transcribed RNA
produced indigenous gene has "predictive value." 55 Further, the study
in the scientific paper "directly proved" that a readthrough transcript
messenger RNA had been produced. 56 The preliminary observation
showed that this messenger RNA was read and used for successful
translation.
57
The court further stated that it was
well known in the art that ribosomal RNA was made of the same
nucleotides as messenger RNA, that any sequence of nucleotides
could be read in groups of three as codons, and that reading these
codons should specify a polypeptide chain that would elongate
until a stop codon was encountered.
58
52. See id. at 903-04.
53. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903-04 (emphasis added).
54. In re Davies, 475 F.2d 667, 670 (CCPA 1973).
55. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 902.
56. Id. at 903.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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The preliminary observations thus showed that codons beyond the
end of the indigenous gene were being translated into peptide chains.
This would "reasonably suggest to one skilled in the art" that if the
codons were inserted beyond the end of the. indigenous gene coded
for a predetermined protein, that protein would be produced. 9 The
court concluded, "it would have been obvious and reasonable to
conclude from the observation reported in Polisky [Note: the
scientific paper cited against the appellants as the prior art] that since
nonsense RNA produced nonsense polypeptides, if meaningful RNA
was inserted instead of ribosomal RNA, useful protein would be the
result. 6°
The O'Farrell invention concerned a method for producing a
fused protein in transformed bacteria. The court's analysis focused
on the availability of scientific techniques and the reasonable
predictability of the result as disclosed in the prior art to find
obviousness. This pattern of analysis is consistent with the nature of
biotechnology invention in this case: the inventive step involved in
this research is the techniques necessary for the discovery of a DNA
sequence rather than patenting the discovery of the DNA sequence
itself.
B. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (1991)61
The case decided by the Federal Circuit again focused on the
availability of scientific methods. The contested patent in this case
concerned the discovery of the DNA sequences encoding the human
protein erythropoietin ("EPO").6 2 Amgen, the patent owner, sued
Genetics Institute, Inc. and Chugai for infringement by producing
EPO using recombinant DNA technology. 63 Chugai challenged the
validity of Amgen's patent for the DNA sequences. 64 The invention
was found by the Federal Circuit to be nonobvious over the prior art
because of the availability of the unique screening and probing
methods for identifying and isolating DNA sequences.65 In this case,
the court extended its analytical framework for nonobviousness of
methods and techniques in the field of biotechnology to inventions
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
62. Id. at 1203-04.
63. Id. at 1204.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1209.
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incorporating DNA sequences.
1. The Invention
EPO is a protein that stimulates the production of red blood
cells. 66 It is a useful therapeutic agent in the treatment of patients
suffering from anemia or other disorders characterized by red blood
67
cell deficiency. Amgen's patent claims cover isolated and purified
DNA sequences that code for EPO and host cells transformed or
transferred with a DNA sequence.68
The court described, in part, the techniques for isolating a gene
coding for a specific protein in a footnote contained in its opinion.
In order to prepare a protein using recombinant DNA technology,
the gene for the protein must first be isolated from a cell's total
DNA by screening a library of that cell's DNA. The DNA library
is screened by use of a probe, a synthetic radiolabelled nucleic acid
sequence which can be used to detect and isolate complementary
base sequences by hybridization. To design a probe when the gene
has not yet been isolated, a scientist must know the amino acid
sequence, or a portion thereof, of the protein of interest. Because
some amino acids have several possible codons and the researcher
cannot know which of the possible codons will actually code for an
amino acid, he or she may decide to design a set of probes that
covers all possible codons for each amino acid comprising the
protein, known as a 'fully-degenerate' set of probes. A library to
be screened can be a genomic library (gDNA), which contains a set
of all the DNA sequences found in an organism's cells or a
complementary DNA (cDNA) library, which is much smaller and
less complex than a gDNA library, and is used frequently when the
tissue source for a given gene is known.
6 9
In biology, the above process of screening and selecting a
particular DNA can be described as "cloning.
70
Cloning a gene sometimes can refer to success in identifying a
gene associated with some phenotype. For example, when
biologists say that the gene for disease X has been cloned, they
mean that the gene's location and DNA sequence has been
identified, although the ability to specifically copy the physical
66. Id. at 1203.
67. Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1203.
68. Id. at 1203-04.
69. See Id. at 1208 n.4.
70. See CHISUM, supra note 1, TECHNOLOGY PRIMERS (Supp. 2004).
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DNA is a side-effect of its identification.
71
Cloning involves first discerning the amino acid sequence of the
desired protein. An approximate DNA sequence can then be deduced
and generated. This DNA sequence, or "probe,"' can be used to find
the exact chromosomal location of the gene that can then be isolated
and purified. The difficulty in cloning the DNA sequences of EPO
(or EPO gene) was that the amino acid sequence of the EPO protein
72was uncertain.
2. Analysis
The district court judge found that the claimed subject matter
met the nonobviousness requirement. 73 The district court determined
that the disputed patent claims covering the DNA sequences were not
invalid under § 103, concluding that the unique probing and screening
method employed by the inventor in isolating and purifying the EPO
gene and the extensive effort required to employ that method made
the invention nonobvious over the prior art.74 The judge stated that
one must inquire whether the prior art would have suggested to one of
ordinary skill in the art that the inventor's probing and screening
method should be carried out and would have a reasonable
expectation of success, viewed in light of the prior art.75 The court
cited a rule established by a case decided by the Federal Circuit that
"[b]oth the suggestion and the [reasonable] expectation of success
must be founded in the prior art, not in the applicant's disclosure. 76
The district court found that in September or October of 1983, the
inventor succeeded in cloning the EPO gene using a "unique"
technique, two sets of fully-degenerate probes to screen a genomic
library. 77 The district court specifically found that, as of 1983, none
of the prior art references this unique technique and that no one had
71. See Cloning, The Free Dictionary.com, at
http://encylopedia.thefreedictionary.conr/cloning (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
72. See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1207.
As expert testimony from both sides indicated, success in cloning the EPO gene
was not assured until the gene was in fact isolated and its sequence known.
Based on the uncertainties of the method and lack of information concerning the
amino acid sequence of the EPO protein, the trial court was correct in concluding
that neither party had an adequate conception of the DNA sequence until
reduction to practice had been achieved; Lin was first to accomplish that goal.
73. Id. at 1207-08.
74. Id. at 1207.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
77. Id. at 1207.
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successfully screened a genomic library using fully-degenerate probes
of such high redundancy as the probes used by the inventor.78 While
it found that defendants had shown that these procedures were
"obvious to try" (which is not the proper standard of obviousness
under §103), the references did not show that there was a reasonable
expectation of success in cloning the EPO gene based on this probing
strategy.79
The Federal Circuit affirmed and reasoned that there was not a
reasonable expectation of success in cloning the EPO gene using
either the inventor's unique gene probing strategy (screening a human
genomic library with two fully-degenerate sets of probes), or the
infringer's alternative suggested strategy (screening a library with the
already known monkey EPO gene as a probe.)80 Trial testimony
supported the district court's conclusion. The Federal Court stated in
relevant part, that:
While this testimony indicates that it might have been feasible,
perhaps obvious to try, to successfully probe a human gDNA
library with a monkey cDNA probe, it does not indicate that the
gene could have been identified and isolated with a reasonable
likelihood of success. Neither the DNA nucleotide sequence of the
human EPO gene nor its exact degree of homology with the
monkey EPO gene was known at the time .... While the idea of
using the monkey gene to probe for a homologous human gene
may have been obvious to try, the realization of that idea would
not have been obvious. There were many pitfalls. Hindsight is not
a justifiable basis on which to find that ultimate achievement of a
long sought and difficult scientific goal was obvious.
8 1
The Federal Circuit briefly recognized the methodological focus
of obviousness analysis. In a footnote, the court noted the following:
[B]oth the district court and the parties have focused on the
obviousness of a process for making the EPO gene, despite the fact
that it is products (genes and host cells) that are claimed in the
patent, not processes. We have directed our attention accordingly,
and do not consider independently whether the products would
have been obvious aside from the alleged obviousness of a method
of making them.
82
78. Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1207-08.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1209.
81. Id. at 1208-09.
82. Id. at 1207 n.3.
610 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 21
It seems that the Federal Court intended to consider the
nonobviousness of the products in the context of whether or not the
processes for isolating the DNA sequences are obvious. However, the
court's subsequent analysis and the holding rely entirely on the
scientific methods and techniques (i.e., the processes of making the
products) available for identifying and isolating the EPO gene. Thus,
the nonobviousness in these experiments is not the DNA sequence
itself, but the actual scientific methods/techniques needed to identify
and isolate the gene.
The court's conclusion that the invention was not obvious is
based on the analysis focusing on the nonobviousness of the scientific
techniques over the prior art.83 The DNA sequence for the EPO gene
was not readily ascertainable through standard techniques disclosed in
the prior art. In other words, the methods of discovery supplied by
the prior art would not stand a reasonable likelihood of success. One
commentator remarked that this approach to obviousness discards the
conventional focus on the invention itself.84  In another case, the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences speculated that the
reasoning underlying this approach might be related to the nature of
the gene. 85 The proper query is whether this approach contradicts the
Federal Circuit precedent that "[t]he patentability of a product does
not depend on its method of production., 86  In other words, if the
preceding rule is true, one may be precluded from arguing that a
composition will not be obvious simply because the method of its
discovery or production is not obvious. This issue will be re-visited
in two other cases involving the patentability of nucleic acids
molecules to be discussed in Parts II.D.2 and II.E.2 infra, in which the
Federal Circuit appears to have shifted from the analysis focusing on
the nonobviousness of the scientific techniques in the prior art to the
analysis of the claimed compositions.
83. Id. at 1209.
84. See Brian C. Cannon, Toward a Clear Standard of Obviousness for Biotechnology
Patents, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 735 (1994). The author stated that the approach recognizes that
the inventive step in biotechnology is not the end product of research, but the research itself.
85. See Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1447 (Bd. of Patent App. and
Interference 1993). The Board surmised that the reasoning behind this approach was related to
the fact that the gene in question had been placed into the public domain when the sequence of
the protein encoded by the gene had also been placed into the public domain. But I think this
speculation is not well reasoned because the fact that the protein may be known does not
necessarily render the gene a public knowledge. In fact, it is the following two factors that are
determinative: (i) the Federal Circuit found that the EPO gene was not unknown at the time of
the invention; and (ii) the method for isolating the gene was not obvious.
86. See In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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C. In re Vaeck (1991) 8 1
The Board affirmed a rejection made by the examiner of the
PTO in respect of a patent claim on grounds of obviousness. 88 The
Federal Circuit reversed the findings of the PTO examiner and the
Board, and held that the invention was not obvious because no
explicit or implicit suggestion was disclosed from the prior art and no
"reasonable expectation of success" for the experiment could be
made. 89 The analysis of the Federal Circuit on nonobviousness in this
case closely followed the reasoning adopted in O'Farrell, although
the conclusion reached is opposite to that reached in O'Farrell
because both an explicit suggestion and a "reasonable expectation of
success" were present in O 'Farrell.
1. The Invention
The claimed invention was directed to the use of genetic
engineering techniques for producing proteins that are toxic to insects
such as larvae of mosquitoes and black flies.90 The Bacillus bacteria
produced proteins that were toxic to insects and therefore useful for
clearing insects from swamps.9 1 Prior art methods of combating the
insects involved spreading or spraying crystalline spores of the
Bacillus proteins over swamps. 92 The spores were environmentally
unstable, however, and would often sink to the bottom of a swamp
before larvae were ever exposed to it, thus rendering this method
prohibitively expensive. 93 Therefore, there was a need for a lower-
cost method of producing the Bacillus proteins in high volume with
application in a more stable vehicle.94 The claimed invention met this
need by providing for the production of the Bacillus proteins within
host cyanobacteria (which in the past had been referred to as "blue-
green algae"), 95 a much less studied species of bacteria that grows on
the swamp surface where they can be consumed by insects.96 The
inventors took an isolated Bacillus gene and combined it with a DNA
87. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 489.
89. Id. at 493-95.
90. Id. at 489-90.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 489.
93. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 489.
94. Id.
95. Cyanobacteria are unique among procaryotes in being capable of oxygenic
photosynthesis.
96. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 489.
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fragment from cyanobacteria to create a hybrid gene.97 The DNA
fragment in the hybrid gene allowed expression of the foreign
Bacillus protein in cyanobacteria, which was transformed by a
plasmid containing the hybrid gene.
98
The Federal Circuit gave much weight to the difficulties with the
experiments involved in the invention, i.e., the difference between
cyanobacteria and Bacillus and the lack of prior knowledge about the
cyanobacteria genus, and found the invention not obvious.99
2. Analysis
During the prosecution of the claimed invention, the PTO
examiner combined two sets of scientific work to find obviousness in
the claimed invention: (a) an article describing the successful
expression of a hybrid gene, which comprised an antibiotic marker
gene and a chloroplast promoter sequence, in cyanobacteria; and (b)
three articles that described expression of Bacillus proteins in other
bacterial hosts.'00 The PTO reasoned that it would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the three described
Bacillus genes for the marker gene in a hybrid gene disclosed in the
first article.' 0 ' This would result in expression of Bacillus proteins in
transformed cyanobacteria.
The Federal Circuit began its majority opinion by setting out the
analytical standards, i.e., where the claimed invention has been
rejected as obvious by combining prior art references, a proper
analysis under § 103 requires, among other things, consideration of
two factors:
(1) whether the prior art would have suggested to those of ordinary
skill in the art that they should make the claimed composition or
device, or carry out the claimed process; and (2) whether the prior
art would also have revealed that in so making or carrying out,
those of ordinary skill would have a reasonable expectation of102
success.
By focusing on the methods revealed by the prior art, the court
found neither the suggestion (whether explicit or implicit) nor the
expectation of success and concluded that the claimed invention was
97. Id. at 489-90.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 494.
100. Id. at 490-91.
101. Id. at 492.
102. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 493.
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not obvious.1 03 The court distinguished O'Farrell by noting that the
invention at issue in that case involved an explicit suggestion and
detailed enabling methodology, thus making the invention obvious.1
0 4
In contrast, the court stated, "the prior art in this case offers no
suggestion, explicit or implicit, of the substitution that is the
difference between the claimed invention and the prior art."' 0 5
Likewise, the court did not find any explicit suggestion that a
hybrid gene containing Bacillus gene can be expressed in
cyanobacteria. The court reasoned that "[t]he expression [of a marker
gene] in cyanobacteria, without more, does not render obvious the
expression of unrelated genes in cyanobacteria for unrelated
purposes."' 0 6 This was because "it is only in recent years that the
biology of cyanobacteria has been clarified."' 0 7  Furthermore, the
court did not find any implicit suggestion for the invention either.
The court acknowledged that the scientific methods for transforming
cyanobacteria were unpredictable; if methods for transforming
cyanobacteria were interchangeable with those for other bacteria, the
substitution of cyanobacteria for other bacteria to express the hybrid
gene would have been implicitly obvious.'0 8 By the same token, no
"reasonable expectation of success" could be found by the court
because of the unpredictability of the same methods for transforming
cyanbacteria.109
A related aspect of this case surrounds the review standard for
obviousness determinations by the Board, i.e., whether the Federal
Circuit can replace its own fact-finding with that made by the
Board.'1° The dissenting opinion in this case indicated that:
The mere denomination of obviousness as a question of law does
not give the court license to decide the factual matters afresh and
ignore the requirement that they be respected unless clearly
erroneous .... There may be more than one way to look at the
prior art, but on this record we are bound by the PTO's
interpretation of the evidence because it is not clearly erroneous
103. Id.
104. Id. at 494-95.
105. See id. at 495.
106. Id. at 493.
107. Id. at 494.
108. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 494.
109. See id. at 495.
110. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04 (Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc. 1997) (explaining that the majority's detailed discussion of the technology is not dissimilar
to a typical exercise in fact finding).
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and its conclusion is unassailable.
I l
Although ultimately a question of law, the nonobviousness
determination of §103 must be based on underlying findings of
fact.112 The concern expressed by the dissenting view here is that the
Federal Circuit should not attempt to retry the entire case in the
absence of a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
committed."' 3 In short, the dissenting opinion seems to suggest that
as long as the analytical approach adopted by the PTO and the Board
(by making factual inquiries regarding, among other things, two
factors: the suggestion to make the invention and a "reasonable
expectation of success" in making or carrying out what has been
suggested) was not incorrect, the way in which the prior art was
looked at by the PTO and the Board should be given deference.
This case also reveals the tension between the PTO (and the
Board) and the Federal Circuit as to which institution is competent in
making the final judgment on factual findings. In this connection, the
dissenting opinion took the position that the Federal Circuit should
not attempt to replace its own interpretation of factual issues with the
factual findings made by the PTO (and the Board) that are not clearly
erroneous.
D. In re Bell (1993)" 4
This case was appealed to the Federal Circuit from the rejection
decision made by the Board affirming the examiner's rejection of a
patent application for an invention involving nucleic acid (DNA and
RNA) molecules containing human sequences coding for proteins on
the ground of obviousness." 5  The Federal Circuit reversed the
Board's decision." 6 The Federal Circuit in this case shifted from its
analysis focusing on obviousness in known scientific methods for
isolating a gene to the availability of the sequence of the gene coding
for the proteins in question (as disclosed or described in the prior art).
This analytical framework appears to be significantly different from
the previous line of cases from the Federal Circuit dealing with
inventions involving recombinant DNA technology (e.g., O'Farrell,
Amgen, and Vaeck).
111. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 497.
112. See MUELLER, supra note 2, at 152.
113. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654,663 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
114. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
115. Id. at 782.
116. Id.
2005] NONOBVIOUSNESS REQUIREMENT UNCERTAINTY 615
1. Invention
The claimed invention was directed to a DNA sequence
encoding for human insulin-like growth factors I and II (IGF-I and
IGF-II), which are proteins." 7  These proteins play a role in the
mediation of somatic cell growth following the administration of
growth hormones. 
1 1 8
The relevant prior art consists of (a) two publications that
disclosed the putative amino acid sequences for IGF-I and IGF-II; and
(b) a prior patent that described a general method for isolating a gene,
specifically describing gene isolation for a protein unrelated to IGF. 19
The patent suggested that the disclosed method "can 'easily' be
applied to isolate genes for an array of proteins including peptide
hormones," and taught that "it is advantageous to design a probe
based on amino acids specified by unique codons.' 2 °
In particular, the two publications show that IGF-I has only a
single amino acid with a unique codon and IGF-II has none. 12' The
prior patent describes a general method for isolating a gene for which
at least a short amino acid sequence of the encoded protein is
known. 22  The method involves preparing a nucleotide probe
corresponding to the known amino acid sequence and using that probe
to isolate the gene of interest.123 "It teaches that it is advantageous to
design a probe based on amino acids specified by unique codons."'
' 24
The prior patent specifically described the isolation of a gene that
codes for human protein unrelated to IGF. 125 It described the design
of the probe employed, stating that it was based on amino acids
specified by unique codons.1
26
2. Analysis
The PTO rejected the claims as obvious in view of the two prior
art sources. 127 The PTO reasoned that the applicants' claimed DNA
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 783.
120. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783, 785 (explaining that the term "unique" refers to an amino
acid coded for by a single codon).
121. Id. at 784.
122. Id. at 783.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. In reBell, 991 F.2d at 783.
127. Id.
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sequences were primafacie obvious "despite the lack of conventional
indicia of obviousness, e.g., structural' similarity between the DNA
which codes for IGF-I and the amino acid sequence of the
polypeptide" because "although a protein and its DNA are not
structurally similar, they are correspondently linked via the genetic
code."' 128 The Board affirmed the PTO's rejection. 129
The Federal Circuit phrased the issue before it as whether "the
Board correctly determined that the amino acid sequence of a protein
in conjunction with a reference indicating a general method of cloning
renders the gene primafacie obvious."'' 30
Treating the PTO's correspondent link theory as amounting to a
rejection based on the two prior publications alone, the court
reversed. 131
It may be true that, knowing the structure of the protein, one can
use the genetic code to hypothesize possible structures for the
corresponding gene and that one thus has the potential for
obtaining that gene. However, because of the degeneracy of the
genetic code, there are a vast number of nucleotide sequences that
might code for a specific protein. In the case of IGF, Bell has
argued without contradiction that the [relevant] amino acid
sequences could be coded for by more than 1036 different
nucleotide sequences, only a few of which are the human
sequences that Bell now claims. Therefore, given the nearly
infinite number of possibilities suggested by the prior art, and the
failure of the cited prior art to suggest which of those possibilities
is the human sequence, the claimed sequences would not have
been obvious.1
32
The court further reasoned "[a]bsent anything in the cited prior
art suggesting which of the 1036 possible sequences ... corresponds to
the IGF gene, the PTO has not met its burden of establishing that the
prior art would have suggested the claimed sequences.1 33 The court
went on to explain:
This is not to say that a gene is never rendered obvious when the
amino acid sequence of its coded protein is known. Bell concedes
that in a case in which a known amino acid sequence is specified
exclusively by unique codons, the gene might have been obvious.
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 785
132. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 784.
133. Id.
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Such a case is not before us. Here, where [the prior art] suggests a
vast number of possible nucleic acid sequences, we conclude that
the claimed human sequences would not have been obvious.
134
The Federal Court rejected the PTO's argument that knowing a
general method for identifying genes through the use of nucleotide
probes, as well as the complete or partial amino acid sequence of a
protein, establishes a primafacie case for the obviousness of the DNA
sequence encoding for the protein.135 The Federal Circuit finally held
that, with respect to patent claims to DNA sequences, the
nonobviousness determination should focus on the DNA molecules as
compositions (or chemical compounds) rather than on the method for
isolating DNA sequences. 136 This approach appears to be consistent
with the precedent set by the Federal Circuit (discussed in Part II.B.2,
supra) stating that "the patentability of a product does not depend on
its method of production," which the Amgen court failed to follow.
13 7
The Federal Circuit reasoned, "[t]he PTO's focus on Bell's method is
misplaced. Bell does not claim a method. Bell claims compositions,
and the issue is the obviousness of the claimed compositions, not of
the method by which they are made.', 3 8 In other words, any given
DNA sequence (whether a full DNA sequence that encodes a protein
or a mere sequence fragment) is obvious only if the prior art actually
recites a similar or identical sequence and not simply a method for
isolating the sequence.
One of the scholars observed that
Under this logic, DNA sequences can be nonobvious no matter
how easy or routine it is to isolate the sequences. This significant
lowering of the patentability bar has resulted in a situation where
many biotechnology companies are seeking patents on hundreds of
thousands of DNA sequence fragments that they have been able to
isolate quickly through routine, automated methods. 1
39
134. Id.
135. Id. at 784-85.
136. Id. at 785.
137. In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
138. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 785.
[T]he PTO emphasizes the similarities between the method by which Bell made
the claimed sequences and the method taught by Weissman. The PTO's focus on
Bell's method is misplaced. Bell does not claim a method. Bell claims
compositions, and the issue is the obviousness of the claimed compositions, not
of the method by which they are made.
Id.; see also In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d at 697 ("[T]he patentability of a product does not depend on
its method of production.").
139. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
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I would posit that a more serious concem,.over the ruling of this
case is that the lower bar for patentability., with respect to the
nonobviousness requirement will ultimately impede the progress of
"useful arts" because the patent owners of hundreds of thousands of
DNA sequence fragments can potentially exclude other scientists
from making or using the patented DNA sequences. The ramification
of the decision in this case may have the effect of tilting the balance
of interests between those of the public and those of the inventors,
favoring the inventors, and thereby frustrating the. constitutional goal
of "promot[ing] the Progress of ... useful Arts."'140
This case might have been decided differently if the Federal
Court had recognized the PTO's argument that the established
relationship via the genetic code between a nucleic acid and the
protein it encodes makes a gene prima facie obvious over its
correspondent protein. 4 1 It appears that this argument is an extension
of the conventional indicia of obviousness in the field of
biotechnology, e.g., structural similarity in the field of chemistry can
find its equivalent in the genetic code relationship between codons
(i.e., the DNA sequence that codes for amino acids) and the amino
acid sequence of the polypeptide that constitutes the protein.
Alternatively, the court would arrive at a different result if the
analytical framework established by the prior cases (e.g., O'Farrell,
Amgen, and Vaeck) were followed. In these cases, the analytical
framework is (1) whether the prior art would have suggested to those
of ordinary skill in the art that they should make the claimed
composition or device, or carry out the claimed process; and (2)
whether the prior art would also have revealed that in so making or
carrying out, those of ordinary skill would have a reasonable
expectation of success. As urged by the PTO, the prior patent made
an explicit suggestion that the disclosed method can "easily" be
applied to isolate genes for an array of proteins including peptide
hormones.142 An argument made by the PTO was that "in view of
[the prior art], a gene is rendered obvious once the amino acid
sequence of its translated protein is known."
1 4 3
My view is that the prior art would have suggested to those
skilled in the art to practice the invention with a reasonable
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834 (1999).
140. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
141. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783-84.
142. Id. at 785.
143. Id.
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expectation of success. For instance, the inventive steps can be
illustrated as following: (1) the complete amino acid sequences as
disclosed by the two publications would have motivated a person of
ordinary skill in the art to clone a gene; (2) the explicit suggestion
disclosed in the prior patent would have taught a technique or method
to design and synthesize probes, which correspond to all possible
codon combinations based on the amino acid sequences; and (3) the
probes can then be used to hybridize with and isolate the DNA
sequences (from a'n appropriate gDNA and/or cDNA library) that
encode the amino acids described in the two publications.
Nonetheless, there are at least two potential counter-arguments
to my proposition above which the Federal Circuit has touched upon
in its opinion-(i) the prior patent taught away from the claimed
invention by emphasizing the importance of unique codons for the
amino acids; and (ii) the prior patent did not "fairly suggest" how to
apply its teachings to amino acid sequences without unique codons.
144
This is because the degeneracy of the genetic code will be the single
reason why the amino acid sequence without unique codons 145 may
not render the correspondent DNA sequence sought to be patented
obvious.
That said, I think the key test is whether those skilled in the art
could practice the invention with a reasonable expectation of success
using the suggestion and method taught by the prior art. In this
context, the observation of the PTO on the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art at the time the invention was made should be given
more deference because the PTO may be more competent to address
this issue.
E. In re Deuel (1995)146
Similar to the situation in In re Bell, this case reached the
Federal Circuit from an appeal of an affirmation by the Board of a
rejection made by the PTO examiner of a patent application involving
an invention concerning cDNA molecules encoding proteins that
stimulate mitogenic activity (cell division) as well as the isolated and
purified proteins on the ground of obviousness. 147  The Federal
144. Id.
145. See JAMES D. WATSON, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 611 (Benjamin
Cummings Publishing Co. 1987) (explaining that because all amino acids but one are specified
by more than one codon, it is not possible to go from an amino acid sequence to a DNA
sequence unambiguously).
146. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
147. Id. at 1553-54.
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Circuit reversed the Board's decision. 148 The issue and the analysis of
this case are quite similar to those presented in Bell. In addition to
reaffirming the principle in Bell that focus must be on the obviousness
of the claimed compositions if the subject matter sought to be
patented is directed to the product (gene) rather than the method of
making it, the Federal Circuit further clarified the role to be played by
the method for making the claimed compound in the context of a
patentability determination.
149
1. Invention
The subject matter of the application pertains to heparin-binding
growth factors ("HBGFs"), which "are proteins that stimulate
mitogenic activity (cell division) and thus facilitate the repair or
replacement of damaged or diseased tissue."1' 0  It is useful to
summarize what the applicants discovered or performed in terms of
the inventive steps:
(1) Applicants "isolated and purified HBGF from bovine uterine
tissue, found that it exhibited mitogenic activity, and determined
the first 25 amino acids of the protein's N-terminal sequence";
(2) Applicants "isolated a cDNA molecule encoding bovine uterine
HBGF by screening a bovine uterine cDNA library with an
oligonucleotide probe designed using the experimentally
determined N-terminal sequence of the HBGF";
(3) Applicants "purified and sequenced the cDNA molecule, which
was found to consist of a sequence of 1196 nucleotide base pairs";
(4) Applicants, "[f]rom the cDNA's nucleotide sequence,....
predicted the complete amino acid sequence of bovine uterine
HBGF";
(5) Applicants "isolated a cDNA molecule encoding human
placental HBGF by screening a human placental cDNA library
using the isolated bovine uterine cDNA clone as a probe";
(6) Applicants "purified and sequenced the human placental cDNA
clone, which was found to consist of a sequence of 961 nucleotide
base pairs"; and
(7) Applicants, "[f]rom the nucleotide sequence of the cDNA
148. Id. at 1560.
149. Id. at 1559.
150, Id. at 1554.
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molecule encoding. human placental HBGF... predicted the
complete amino acid sequence of human placental HBGF .... The
predicted human placental and bovine uterine HBGFs each have
168 amino acids and calculated molecular weights of 18.9 kD. Of
the 168 amino acids present in the two HBGFs discovered by
[Applicants], 163 are identical."' 151
At issue were four claims directed to purified and isolated DNA
and cDNA sequences. Two claims (5 and 7) were directed to the
specifically disclosed cDNA molecules encoding human and bovine
HBGFs, respectively, while the remaining two claims generically
encompassed all isolated and purified DNA sequences (natural and
synthetic) encoding human and bovine HBGFs. 15
2
2. Analysis
The examiner rejected all the claims as obvious in light of two
prior art references.15 3  The first reference described "a general
technique for cloning a gene."' 5 4 The second reference disclosed
heparin-binding brain mitogens (HBBMs) isolated from human and
bovine brain tissue.' 55. The second reference (1) determined the
HBBMs' first 19 amino acids (N-terminal sequence), which were
identical for the human and bovine versions (and the same as the N-
terminal sequence the applicant disclosed for its HBGFs), (2) taught
that HBBMs are brain-specific, and (3) suggested that the proteins
may be homologous between species. 156 It disclosed no DNA or
cDNA sequences for the HBBMs. 157 The examiner reasoned that (1)
"[The second reference's] published N-terminal sequence would have
motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to clone [the] gene
because cloning the gene would allow recombinant production of
HBGF, a useful protein," and (2) "a person of ordinary skill in the art
could have designed a gene probe based on [the second reference's]
disclosed N-terminal sequence, then screened a DNA library in
accordance with [the first reference's] gene cloning method to isolate
a gene encoding an HBGF."'
' 58
The applicant argued that the second reference taught away from
151. Id. at 1555.
152. InreDeuel, 51 F.3dat 1555.
153. Id. at 1555-56.
154. Id. at 1556.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1556.
158. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1556.
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the claimed cDNA molecules because it suggested-that HBBMs were
brain-specific, discouraging one from trying to isolate cDNA clones
from human placental and bovine uterine cDNA libraries. 59 The
examiner made the rejection final, commenting that
it was well known in the art at the time the invention was made
that proteins, especially the general class of heparin binding
proteins, are highly homologous between species and tissue type.
It would have been entirely obvious to attempt to isolate a known
protein from different tissue types and even different species.
60
The Board affirmed. 161 Similar to the issue presented in Bell, the
issue was "whether or not knowledge of the partial amino acid
sequence of a protein, in conjunction with a reference indicating a
general method of cloning, renders the invention as a whole, i.e., the
[sequences of] gene[s],primafacie obvious.,' 162
The Board indicated that
[W]e are constantly advised by the patent examiners, who are
highly skilled in this art, "that cloning procedures are routine in the
art."... One of ordinary skill in this art, advised of the existence
and isolation of a functional protein, is also necessarily advised of
the existence of a gene which codes for the protein, but does not
know the gene's structure. There is incentive or motivation to
isolate (clone) the gene for any functional and useful protein
because it would then enable production of large amounts of the
protein for further study and commercial use. We do not subscribe
to appellants' proposition that the failure of the references to teach
the structure of the claimed DNA precludes the teachings thereof
from serving as evidence to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness. The argument is contrary to a body of law which
holds that a product may be described by the process of making
it .... Though those skilled in the art may be unaware of the exact
chemical structure of a gene they are aware that it is composed of
an unknown but established, relatively unchanging array of
nucleotides which code for the particular protein. Importantly,
they are also aware that the gene will hybridize with another DNA
having the same assemblage of adjacent nucleotides for at least a
portion of the gene. Those skilled in the art are also aware of
established procedures for isolating the gene using the
159. Id. at 1557-58.
160. Id. at 1556.
161. Id.
162. See Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1447 (Bd. of Patent App. and
Interference 1993).
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hybridization phenomenon.
163
The Board went on to distinguish Bell:
Although the Court described the issue using broad language, it did
not render a broad decision. Rather, the Court limited its decision
to the facts of the case. First, the Bell Court decided that the
reference which provided the amino acid sequence of the protein
did not, by itself, make obvious the specifically claimed...
correspondent gene because of the degeneracy of the genetic code.
The Court then looked to the secondary reference to determine
whether the cloning technique taught therein pointed the way to the
gene. The Court reviewed the secondary reference and determined
that it taught away from a viable process which could be used for
cloning the particular gene set forth in the Bell application.
164
The Board was not persuaded by applicants' argument that its
DNA was isolated from bovine uterus and human placenta tissue
whereas the prior art used brain tissue and taught that the protein was
tissue specific. 165  In other words, the Board affirmed the PTO's
finding that it was obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the
invention was made that a known protein could be isolated from
different tissue types and from different species.
Like in the case of Bell, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's
decision and holding that rejection of the claims to specific cDNA
sequences (claims 5 and 7) was improper because nothing in the prior
art suggested the claimed structures. 16 6  Case law on prima facie
obviousness of chemical compounds did not apply.
167
Again, the court did not accept the position that given the
established genetic code relationship between nucleic acids and the
correspondent amino acids and the routine method of gene cloning, a
partial amino acid sequence disclosed in a prior art reference may
render the DNA and cDNA molecules encoding the protein prima
facie obvious. The court reasoned,
one could not have conceived the subject matter of claims 5 and 7
based on the teachings in the cited prior art because, until the
claimed molecules were actually isolated and purified, it would
163. Id. at 1447-49 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 1449.
165. Id. at 1450.
166. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
167. Id. at 1558-59.
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have been highly unlikely for one of ordinary skill in the art to
contemplate what was ultimately obtained. What cannot be
contemplated or conceived cannot be obvious. 
168
The court stressed that "[a] general motivation to search for
some gene that exists does not necessarily make obvious a
specifically-defined gene that is subsequently obtained as a result of
that search,"'169 and that "[tihe genetic code relationship between
proteins and nucleic acids does not overcome the deficiencies of the
cited references."
70
A prior art disclosure of the amino acid sequence of a protein does
not necessarily render particular DNA molecules encoding the
protein obvious because the redundancy of the genetic code
permits one to hypothesize an enormous number of DNA
sequences coding for the protein. No particular one of these DNAs
can be obvious unless there is something in the prior art to lead to
the particular DNA and indicate that it should be prepared. We
recently held in In re Baird... that a broad genus does not
necessarily render obvious each compound within its scope.
Similarly, knowledge of a protein does not give one a conception
of a particular DNA encoding it. Thus, afortiori, [the second prior
art reference's] disclosure of the N-terminal portion of a protein,
which the PTO urges is the same as HBGF, would not have
suggested the particular cDNA molecules defined by claims 5 and
7. This is so even though one skilled in the art knew that some
DNA, albeit not in purified and isolated form, did exist. The
compounds of claims 5 and 7 are specific compounds not
suggested by the prior art.' 7 '
It conceded that "[a] different result might pertain.., if there
were prior art, e.g., a protein of sufficiently small size and simplicity,
so that lacking redundancy, each possible DNA would be obvious
over the protein."'
172
As in Bell, the court held that the PTO erred in focusing on
isolation methods when the claims defined compounds.
We today reaffirm the principle, stated in Bell, that the existence of
a general method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is
essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific
molecules themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of
168. See id. at 58.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1558-59.
172. In reDeuel, 51 F.3d at 1559.
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other prior art that suggests the claimed DNAs. A prior art
disclosure of a process reciting a particular compound or obvious
variant thereof as a product of the process is, of course, another
matter, raising issues of anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as well
as obviousness under § 103. Moreover, where there is prior art
that suggests a claimed compound, the existence, or lack thereof,
of an enabling process for making that compound is surely a factor
in any patentability determination .... There must, however, still
be prior art that suggests the claimed compound in order for a
primafacie case of obviousness to be made out ....173
In this context, the court seemed to clarify that the existence of a
general method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is "essentially
irrelevant" to the question of nonobviousness if the claimed invention
directs to a compound rather than a method of making it. 174 This
ruling appears to be directly inconsistent with the position in Amgen
that the nonobviousness of an invention should be based on the
analysis focusing on the nonobviousness of the scientific techniques
for making the invention. The focus on the nonobviousness of the
product (i.e., the DNA molecules) rather than the method to derive the
product represents a rejection of the Amgen analysis while the prior
holding of the Federal Circuit (discussed in Part II.B.2, supra) is now
back in favor.
The court finally reversed the rejections because the PTO did not
articulate any separate reasons for holding these claims
unpatentable. 175 The second reference did not fully anticipate these
generic claims, but the court appears to have hinted that the
specification might not provide adequate enabling support due to the
lack of enabling process for making the claimed compound.
176
In sum, the Federal Circuit's focus on the obviousness of the
claimed invention (i.e., DNA sequences or molecules) may be correct
if the invention claims the composition rather than the method to
produce the composition. However, from a technological standpoint,
it may not be accurate to say that a DNA composition is not obvious
if the prior art reference does not recite a similar or identical DNA
sequence because, as the PTO observed, the corresponding link (in
the form of a genetic code) between a DNA sequence and its encoded
protein must be considered.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1560.
176. Id.
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III. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
To ensure that more certainty will result from the Federal
Court's decisions relating to the nonobviousness standards, I would
like to identify below three specific proposals regarding the
nonobviousness standard under § 103 of the Patent Act as applied to
gene-related inventions:
(1) By adapting to the latest advances in the research strategies
in the genetic engineering field, 177 the Federal Circuit should
accept the position that the corresponding link between a
gene and its encoded protein via a genetic code renders the
gene obvious when the complete or partial amino acid
sequence is known and the implicit position that this
relationship raises a prima facie case of structural
obviousness similar to the relationship between closely
related homologues, analogs, and isomers in chemistry. This
proposed approach would cure the defective analysis made
by the Federal Circuit in Bell and Deuel that a similar or
identical DNA sequence be referenced in the prior art before
obviousness can be found.
(2) Another proposal put forward by some commentators is for a
heightened nonobviousness standard under which the patent
applicant must sequence a complete gene, or at least enough
of a gene necessary to determine its function and preliminary
diagnostic applications. 78  Some public policy purposes
behind this proposal include (1) maintaining uniformity with
other biotechnological requirements of the patent statute; (2)
reducing irresponsible gene patenting behavior in the
industry; and (3) regaining the public's bargaining power in
granting gene-related patents. Furthermore, this heightened
standard would promote the progress of "useful Arts" as
intended by the United States Constitution. This proposal
should tend to counter-balance the shift of focus (in Bell and
Deuel) from the nonobviousness of methods or techniques to
177. See CHISUM, supra note I at 682. Biological investigators have devised certain
experimental strategies to facilitate the isolation of the desired gene once the amino acid
sequence is known. See also Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 9. This article summarizes a
number of new research strategies designed to reduce or eliminate the guesswork in synthesizing
the best oligonucleotide probes for obtaining full-length cDNAs and genes, such as computer
programs, algorithms, DNA and protein databases, etc.
178. See Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 9.
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the nonobviousness of products (i.e., DNA sequences) by
emphasizing the usefulness or the "utility" standard of the
claimed DNA sequences.
(3) Given the PTO's comparative institutional advantage, the
Federal Circuit should show greater deference to the factual
findings of the PTO. Attention should be directed to which
institution (i.e., the PTO or the Federal Circuit) has the
resources to investigate and understand an expanding
amount of complex, constantly changing information. A
comparative analysis of the available institutions suggests
that the PTO may be the institution best situated to address
technological change in biotechnology. This proposal would
alleviate the existing tension between the PTO and the
Federal Circuit in making factual findings (as discussed in
relation to Vaeck) and in determining the level of ordinary
skill in the biotechnology field (as discussed in relation to
Bell and Deuel).
IV. CONCLUSION
From the review of the above five cases in which the non-
obviousness issue relating to gene-related inventions has been
thoroughly discussed by the Federal Circuit, a two-step standard can
be identified: (1) whether the prior art would have suggested to those
of ordinary skill in the art that they should make the claimed
composition or device, or carry out the claimed process; and (2)
whether the prior art would also have revealed that in so making or
carrying out, those of ordinary skill would have a reasonable
expectation of success.
The PTO has strictly followed the above standard in making
their factual inquiries and evaluation surrounding the non-
obviousness issue (e.g., as in Bell and Deuel). One of the differences
between the approach of the PTO and that of the Federal Circuit
appears to be that the PTO showed familiarity with the developments
in the biotechnology industry at the time the invention was made, and
therefore was more stringent (as compared with the position of the
Federal Circuit) in deciding the nonobviousness issue. After all, the
use of the PTO's approach is more likely to ensure that the
nonobviousness requirement be met only if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been nonobvious at the time
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the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art. In
this context, then, the Federal Circuit should give greater deference to
the PTO as far as the factual findings and specific knowledge of the
technological changes in biotechnology field are concerned.
